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Secretary, ex pane Venables and Thompson 
[1997] 3 WLR 23, an application for 
judicial review in which the two boys 
challenged the Home Secretary's 
decisions in setting the tariff on several 
grounds. His decisions were overruled in 
the House of Lords and thus did this 
horrible murder give rise to what will in
o
future years become a leading decision on 
several aspects of judicial review.
THE HOME SECRETARY'S 
MISTAKES
The case demonstrates the 
development in the context of the 
detention of children of the already 
strong judicial policy that determining 
the penal element in a sentence   such as 
fixing the tariff  is a function akin to that
o
of a sentencing judge. Thus such 
decisions are to be accompanied by the 
highest standard of procedural propriety 
(as in R v Home Secretary, ex pane Doody 
[1994] AC 531) and to be decided with 
strict regard only to relevant 
considerations.
TABLOID JOURNALISM
Ill-informed and emotional criticism, fanned 
by tabloid journalism, should not determine 
how long any individual stays in jail or 
detention.
Consequently ijie Home Secretary 
could not take into account the public 
clamour (as evidenced by the petitions) 
for a severe penalty in the Venables and 
Thompson case (per Lords Goff, Steyn and 
Hope; Lord Lloyd dissenting), although 
he could take into account public
concern of a general nature (for instance, 
'relating to the prevalence of certain 
types of offence'). This, it is submitted, is 
clearly right. While public confidence in 
the administration of justice is important, 
ill-informed and emotional criticism, 
fanned by tabloid journalism, should not 
determine how long any individual stays 
in jail (or detention).
But that was not the only error made 
by the Home Secretary. His policy of 
treating children detained during Her 
Majesty's pleasure in the same way as 
mandatory life prisoners meant that he 
set the tariff and then did not, save if 
evidence about the circumstances of the 
commission of the crime or the 
applicant's state of mind at that time 
came to light, review it. This policy was 
rejected as unlawful (Lords Browne- 
Wilkinson, Steyn and Hope; Lords Goff 
and Lloyd dissenting), mainly on the 
ground that it was too rigid in that it 
excluded review on the ground of events 
that had occurred since the commission 
of the offence. This reasoning does not 
depend upon the applicants being 
children, although with children the 
changes in the individual as the child 
grows up are likely to be greater.
THE WELFARE OF THE 
CHILD
But in addition, in the case of children, 
s. 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 
1933 required that ''every court in dealing 
with a child shall have regard to the 
welfare of the child' (emphasis added). 
Surprisingly, perhaps, counsel for the 
Home Secretary conceded that the 
minister (although not a court) was
bound by this duty. It then followed that, 
while he could set a provisional tariff, he 
was bound, in having regard to a child's 
welfare, to keep that tariff under review 
and to adjust it (if appropriate) to take 
account of the precise circumstances of 
the child as he or she grew up.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
DECISION
The consequences of the decision will 
be far-reaching. Several high profile 
murderers who have been set very high 
tariffs, or told that they will remain in 
prison for the rest of their lives, may seek 
to force the Home Secretary to review 
their tariffs on the ground that they have 
changed over the years since the crime. 
For the general law of judicial review, 
however, the case is likely to be less 
dramatic. None the less the extensive 
discussion of the errors made in setting 
an over-rigid policy (which was arguably 
in conflict with a statute) and the 
determination of relevant and irrelevant 
considerations will prove very valuable. 
The orthodox principles of judicial 
review, ever flexible, have once more 
borne fruit in a novel and difficult area of 
decision-making and have broughto o
fairness even to the perpetrators of an 
horrific murder. ©
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Vocational legal education is on theo
cusp between the universities and the 
professions. Historically the universities 
stayed aloof from the process of training, 
regarding the courses as lacking
o o o
intellectual and educational credibility. 
The training schools such as the Inns of 
Court School of Law and The College of 
Law were regarded as trade schools that 
were wholly subordinate to the
professions. The polytechnics, with clear 
vocational aims, were more amenable to 
partnership with The Law Society and 
largely accepted professional regulation 
of their Common Professional 
Examination and Law Society Finals 
courses.
LEGAL PRACTICE COURSE
The Legal Practice Course (LPC)
brokered a compromise between the 
providers of legal education and The Law 
Society, which brought a few of the old 
universities into the market. Standards, 
in the form of outcome statements, were 
specified by The Law Society with each 
provider building its own course around 
them. P\igorous and continuing control is 
retained by The Law Society through a 
system of validation and inspection. 25
26
Examinations are set locally but 
supervised by external examiners 
appointed by The Law Society. In this 
way, the profession has maintained 
control of what is needed as preparation 
for practice while allowing the providers 
to decide how those needs are met.
INTEGRATION OF TRAINING
The Lord Chancellor's Advisory 
Committee on Legal Education and 
Conduct (ACLEC) report backed the 
universities' call for greater freedom from 
professional control at the academic 
stage, while recommending that in return
o ' o
the law schools should start to integrate 
academic and professional training. To 
Harry Arthurs, this is 'a bargain with 
Faustian potential' (see H W Arthurs, 
'Hall a League Onwards', The Law Teacher, 
Vol. 31 No. 1 p. 8). The pure waters of 
academic law will not mix with the oil of 
vocational training.
Even the call from certain quarters of 
the profession for more black letter law 
(see R Youard, 'A Plea for an Old 
Fashioned Academic Education', The 
Society of Public Teachers of Law (SPTL) 
Newsletter, Winter 1996 p. 9) will be 
viewed with deep suspicion by academics 
of a different persuasion. As the recently 
published survey of law schools shows 
(see P Harris and M Jones, 'A Survev of 
Law Schools in the UK 1996', The Law 
Teacher, Vol. 31 No. 1 p. 38), the 
proportion of law students going into the 
professions differs wildly from law school 
to law school. Sad ironies are apparent. 
Highly academic Oxbridge graduates are 
snapped up by the professions, whereas 
graduates from vocationally-orientated 
new universities are ignored by firms and 
chambers. Pluralism rather than 
uniformity is the best way forward in 
such a context (see Professor W 
Twining's address to the SPTL
o
Conference, 15 September 1995).
FREEZING LPC PLACES
Free/ing the allocation of LPC places has 
been strongly criticised by universities and 
privately by members of The Law Society's 
own Legal Practice Course Committee.
The parties to this allegedly Faustian 
bargain endow each other with diabolic 
qualities. Academics are regarded as 
dealing only with the pathological legal 
situation, while the professions 
emphasise the routine and the
boring. Academics compartmentalise, 
professionals oversimplify. Academics 
begin with principles, professionals with 
their unprincipled clients.
THE NUMBERS GAME
The battle for control of the vocational 
stage does not just encompass the aims 
and content of the courses. Numbers are 
a potent source of conflict. Solicitors, 
suffering from the recession and the loss 
of traditional monopolies such as 
conveyancing, have complained bitterly at 
the burgeoning numbers graduating from 
universities who are seeking training 
contracts in an already overcrowded 
profession. Martin Mears, who 
represented the Poujardiste tendency in 
The Law Society, campaigned to limit the 
numbers entering the LPC and to gain 
professional control of the numbers 
entering the profession. The attempt wras 
abandoned following legal opinion that 
the proposed restriction would 
contravene competition law.
approvals for additional places until the 
year 2000. The allocation of places to 
LPCs had, in the vast majority of cases, 
not been looked at since 1993. With 
some institutions straining at the leash 
and some less than half full, the freeze has 
been strongly criticised by universities 
and privately by members of The Law 
Society's own Legal Practice Course 
Committee.
Solicitors have complained bitterly at the 
burgeoning numbers graduating from 
universities who are seeking training 




Professional bodies and universities 
should stick to their respective lasts. As a 
validating body, The Law Society has an 
interest in ensuring that every LPC
O J
maintains quality as its numbers grow or
The universities' slant on numbers is 
wholly different. Thev had entered a 
market for the LPC which had a 
monopoly supplier, the College of Law. At 
validation, their intakes were subject to 
an upper limit, normally 100 150, and 
considerable capital investment was 
required to gain validation. Since the 
LPC began in 1994, the market has 
crashed. Applications were down by 15% 
in 1996 and have decreased bv a further 
12% in 1997. Some courses have been 
less than half full, although a minority of 
courses continue to receive strong 
applications.
Against this background, The Law
o o '
Society's Training Committee decided in 
April 1997 to freeze the allocation of 
LPC places, with a moratorium on
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reduce. That does not give it a licence to 
meddle in the market or artificially to 
maintain a historical distribution of 
student numbers. The cross-pollination 
of academic and vocational education will 
take time to bear fruit. It would be tragic 
if The Law Society's lurches of policy 
caused the tree to be cut down before the 
fruit even begins to form. @
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